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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This case involves a Writ of Review which is being taken 
, , 1111 ,1 dc>nial of a Motion for Review by the Industrial Commission 
'"inc; out of an industrial accident and essentially involves 
the question of whether the statutory scheme for permanent total 
11isability benefits requires that physical impairment be the 
f.>rtme factor for a worker's disability in order to qualify for 
such benefits. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case involves review of the final administrative deci-
sion of the Industrial Commission of March 23, 1983 denying 
permanent total disability benefits to the Employee on the ex-
clusive basis that the primary reason for his unemployability was 
his age rather than his physical impairment. The Petition for a 
Writ of Review dated April 21, 19b3 of the Denial of a Motion for 
Review by the Industrial Commission involving the Employee's 
Workers' Compensation claim was timely filed pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, §35-1-83 (1953, as amended), Rule 72 et ~of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, inter alia. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Employee seeks reversal of the final administrative 
decision of the Industrial Commission with a decision holding 
that the Employee is entitled to permanent total disability 
benefits. 
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STATEME~T OF FACTS 
On J an u a r y 2 5 , 1 9 8 0 * the Em p lo y e e , a 6 7 - y ea r - o 1 d u n ci , r : , 
coal miner at the time, was injured in an industrial ,1, 
while working for Emery Mining Corporation. Record, pp. d"I 
lie was riding on a mantrip at the end of his shift when it hi, 
bump (or lump of coal) in the roadway jarring his bad·. Recoi' 
pp. 1, 4-5, 23, 55 and 65. An Application for Hearing was suL 
sequently filed, answered, a hearing held and referral to J 
Medical Panel made. Record, pp. 6-9, 11-12, 18-52 and 129-31, 
The Medical Panel found that he suffered from a permanent partial 
impairment attributable to his orthopedic problems** and his loss 
of hearing equivalent to 27"/, of the whole body which was subse· 
quently reduced to 26% after objections were filed by. the Claim-
ant, and corrections made by the Administrative Law Judge. 
Record, pp. 140-41 and 154-56. 
The file in this case contains the following matters rele-
vant to a permanent total disability claim: 
1. The Utah !:itate Board of Education, Division of Rehab-
ilitation Services written certification of July 9, 1982 of the 
* There is some quest ion in the record about whether the dact 
of the industrial injury was January 25, 1980, January z; 
1980 or January 28, 1980, but resolution of it is not mater-
ial to this appeal. See Record, pp. 1, 4, 9, 22, 43, 8', 
123-25 and 127-28. 
** The Employee's most recent operation on his bdcl< occcJSl'>' 
by the industrial injury involved lumbar decompressic''1 
L4-S laminectomy with foramenotomy at LS-SI Jnd L:. 
Record, pp. 71, 7 5, 7 7 and 81 . 
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Employee's inabi 1 i ty to qualify for rehabilitation or re-employ-
rne11t. Record, p. 97. 
i'. The Employee's treating physician's suggestion to the 
employee " it would be better to retire instead of going back 
t•J work"; and his medical reports of July 14, 1980 expressing his 
opinion that he did" ... not think this patient should attempt to 
work in the . " mine ... ; of March 5 1981 indicating that he felt 
that he " would be better off not working in the mine" and 
recommending that " he take a retirement"; and of September 9, 
1981 reiterating his suggestion that the Employee retire 
because he is unable to go back to work." Record, pp. 28, 81, 86 
and 9 3. 
3. The Employee's 40 year work history exclusively limited 
to heavy labor, specifically, coal mining, approximately 85% of 
which involved underground employment. Record, p. 30. 
4. The Employee's testimony that he could no longer per-
form the duties of a mechanic in the coal mines -- his main job 
the last 25 years that he worked -- due to the work requirements 
of the job and his physical impairments. Record, pp. 31-34. 
5. The Employee's age at the time of the his injury (67), 
and limited formal education (third year of high school). 
Record, pp. 1, 21 and 30. 
6. The Employee's desc•iption of his present physical 
limitations including sitting, standing, lifting, carrying and 
bending, in conjunction with his limited daily activites occa-
sr0ned by his physical impairmencs. Record, pp. 33-35. 
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At the t im e of the Employee's industrial injury, h~ " 
hadn't even thought of retiring ... " and even commenlerJ d r 
hearing that he " ... knew one guy out there, th cl l \v,i ~ l n 1, 
Canyon, who was seventy-five and st i 11 working. 1 h.ey ·I• 
require you to retire at any certain age." Record, pp. JO " 
45. 
The record in this case does not contain any rebuttal ev 1 
dence whatsoever to indicate that the Employee could engage i· 
any form of meaningful employment given his overall physica 
condition, work experience, education and age. The Divis ion 0 
Rehabilitation Services written certification that the Employe' 
could not be re-trained or re-employed complies with the require· 
ments of lJtah Code Annotated, §35-1-67 (1953, as amended) f" 
purposes of permanent total disability claims, and is uncontro-
verted in this Record. Record, p. 97 .. 
Nevertheless, in the Order of the Administrative Law Judg 
of February 4, 1983, the following finding with regard to tr-
Employee's claim to permanent total disability* benefits wa 
made: 
* 
Regarding the issue of permanent total disability, 
the Administrative Law Judge has reviewed the 
file, and finds that the Applicant is not entitled 
to a tentative finding, since it appears to the 
Administrative Law Judge that his prime reason for 
bein unem lo ed at the resent time is a e rather 
tan p ys1ca impairment. Recor , p. Em-
phasis added.) 
Although the Application for Hearing did not identitv 
claim for permanent total disability benefits, il was s 
sequently raised by motion on February 9, 1982 -- prioc 
the administrative hearing -- and by letters to the Ad~ 
istrative Law Judge on January 19, 1983 and July 14, 19.:. 
prior to the issuance of the Findings of Fact, Conclus1 
of Law and Order. Record, pp. 14-17, 90 and 150-51. 
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On Febructry 10, 1983 the Employee filed a Motion for Review 
,.,1111 lhe Industrial Commission challenging this finding arguing 
11 .Jt a permdnent total disability claim is based upon a combina-
L 10n ot factors, including age, education, work experience and 
physical impairment; that the standard for establishing a perma-
nent total disability claim is whether the Employee is totally 
d 1sabled from engaging in any line of gainful employment; and 
that whether his inability to perform any manner of employment is 
primarily caused by a physical impairment as distinguished from 
age or some other factor is iIIl!Ilaterial. Record, pp. 159-61. 
On March 23, 1983, the CoIIl!Ilission summarily denied the 
~lotion for Review without COIIl!Ilent. Record, pp. 169-70. 
The Petition for a Writ of Review was timely filed with the 
Utah Supreme Court on April 21, 1983. Record, pp. 171-75. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The sole issue presented in this case is whether Utah Code 
Annotated, §35-1-67 (1953, as amended) requires a finding that 
physical impairment be the primary factor for a worker's unem-
ployability in order for him to qualify for permanent total 
disability benefits. 
It is the Employee's position that Utah Code Annotated, 
~3}-1-67 (1953, as amended) does not require that physical im-
pairment be the primary factor for a worker's unemployability in 
urrl2r to qualify for permanent total disability benefits, and to 
i~''V such a claim on the basis that age is the primary factor 
cuntr ibut ing to his disability is contrary to law. It is also 
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the position of the Employee thdt to the extent thcit ;,mb 1 ,, 
exists in the permanent total disability stdtule, 1n,1 
ambiguity should be resolved in fcivor of the claim due 1 
remedial nature of Workers' Compensation legislation. 
ARGUMENT 
THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED 
IN DENYING THE EMPLOYEE PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY BE~EFITS BECAUSE AGE IS A 
RELEVANI FAcroR TO SUCH A DETERMINATION 
The Employee submits that age is a relevant factor to G, 
considered in a permanent total disability claim, and that tr., 
degree to which it contributes to such a determination is irreie-
vant and cannot be utilized to deny a permanent total disabilit. 
claim where it constitutes a substantial or primary factor 1 
such a disability determination. 
Although this Court has not specifically passed on th:c 
particular quest ion, several neighboring j ur i sd ic t ions ha''-
concluded that age is in fact a factor in permanent total dis 
ability claims, while other courts have additionally held th 0 
elderly members of the working force who sustain industri2 
injuries are entitled to permanent total disability benef 1 
notwithstanding their advanced years. 
In Brown v. Safeway Stores, 483 P. 2d 305 (N. Mex. 1971), ' 
plaintiff, an 18-year-old high school graduate, was traineo 
plant cucumbers and potatoes, but suffered from an injured b~ 
The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that he might be em~l': 
at something, but that there was no evidence of that in 
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record to support such a finding and, therefore, found the in-
1 11rerJ employee to be totally disabled. The Defendant contended 
· '' 1l lhe burden was on the Plaintiff to show that he was disabled 
I r<Hn doing any work for which he was fitted by age, education, 
Lra1ning and previous work experience to which the Court respond-
ed: 
We agree that the proof of the disability is on 
the plaintiff, but after plaintiff has introduced 
evidence as to his ~' education, training and 
mental capacity, the-OUrden of coming forward is 
on the defendant. It is much easier for the 
defendant to prove the employability of the plain-
tiff for a particular job than for plaintiff to 
try to prove the universal negative of not being 
employable at any work. If the defendant chooses 
to stand on the evidence introducted by plaintiff 
and not rebut the evidence, he may run a great 
risk since the issue may become one of substantial 
evidence, which is not a question of quantity but 
substance. Id. at 308. (Emphasis added.) 
Oregon has similarly ruled in the case of Swanson v. West-
r,ort Lumber Co., 479 P.2d 1005 (Ore. 1971) where a 63-year-old 
mm possessing a 60 percent disability of the right leg had 
sustained a serious low back injury. He was restricted from 
heavy lifting, stooping, squatting, bending, could not walk more 
lhan four or five blocks without experiencing additional pain, 
and could not sit, stand or lie in one position for a prolonged 
period of time. In response to the Defendant's claim that the 
Applicant could be employed in light work, the Oregon Supreme 
Court commented as follows: 
Total disability under the Workmen's Compensation 
Act does not mean permanent utter haplessness. 
[citation omitted.] The fact that a claimant is 
ccipable of performing some light work or earning 
occdsional wages does not necessarily preclude a 
tinrl1ng of total disability .... 
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**** 
[O]pinions have stressed thdt th~ 
burden is on the employer to prove the civ.ii l.1-
bility of steaay 1<orl<-, once the claimant hLis b~c:n 
shown to be in the 'odd-lot' category. There is 
no presumption that, merely because c la imdnt is 
physically able to do light work-, appropriate 
employment is regularly available to him. 
If the evidence of degree of obvious physical 
impairment, coupled with other factors, such as 
claimant's mental capacity, education, training, 
or ~ places claimant prima facie in the 'odd-
lot category, the burden should be on the employ-
er to show that some !<ind of suitable work is 
regularly and continuously available to the claim-
ant. Id. at 1006-08. (Emphasis added.) 
The final administrative decision of the Utah Industria. 
Co=ission strongly infers the existence of a different standar'. 
of unemployability for elderly workers than exists for younge: 
workers. In effect, the position appears to be that elder:. 
workers because of their age would be in a more difficult pos1· 
tion to obtain such benefits than would a younger employe. 
However, such is not the case as many decision of other juris· 
dictions recognize. 
Furthermore, Congress has enacted the Age Discrimination 
Employment Act [ADEA] 29 USCS §§621 et.~·· to insure equ 0 
treatment and to prohibit discriminatory conduct of older pe: 
sons. Through the ADEA, Congress has attempted to promote t 
employment of older persons based upon abi 1 i ty to work rat'" 
than age. In 1978, Congress amended the ADEA by raising 
mandatory retirement age from sixty-five to seventy. This a11"' 
ment further reflects public policy and Congressional intent 
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1Jlder persons should be allowed to work as long as they have the 
,1, 1 l 1 t_y. Thus, if the intent is to encourage older persons to 
, ""' 1nue worl<ing by enacting laws which prohibit discrimination 
b.Jsed upon age, then the intent must also be to award older 
persons the benefits to which they are entitled in accordance 
with the same standards provided younger members of the work 
force. 
In M. D. Thompson & Son Co. v. Mccuan, 502 S.W.2d 93 (Ark. 
1973), evidence that a 68-year-old claimant who had worked on a 
farm and in logging was an able-bodied manual worker prior to 
spinal fracture and after injury was unable to perform any re-
munerative sevices supported a finding of total disability. 
In Eagle Indemnity Co. v. Hadley, 218 P.2d 488 (Ariz. 1950), 
evidence that a 66-year-old claimant who had performed electrical 
work on airplanes as a manual laborer who had enjoyed extraordi-
narily good health prior to his industrial injury but who subse-
quently was unable to per form any remunerative employment sup-
~or t ed a finding of total disability. 
And, finally, in 
N.W. 656 (Minn. 1934), 
Furlong v. Northwestern Casket Co., 
evidence that a 71-year-old claimant 
252 
[ 77 
at the time of the hearing] who had worked for many years fer a 
casket company and who after his industrial injury was unable to 
do even light work for any sustained period of time, supported a 
t1naing of total incapacity. 
111 conclusion, the Employee submits that age is an employ-
•n;or:t-related factor which must be considered in all permanent 
l•Jldl •J1sability determinations. In addition, because the stat-
-9-
ute does not provide that any factor need be a primary fau,,· 
and no decision of this or any other Court has so held, it 
also the Employee's position that age may in an appropri~rP 
-- such as this perhaps -- be a primary factor which such de·' 
mination would not prevent a finding of permanent total disah1 
ity. 
I I 
THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED 
IN DENYING THE EMPLOYEE PERMANENT 
TOTAL DISABILitY BENEFITS ON ACCOUNT 
OF AGE BECAUSE A PERMANENT TOTAL 
DIABILIIY DETERMINATION DoES Not 
RE~UIRE THAT HIS IMPAIRMENT BE THE 
RIMARY FACIOR oF HIS DISABILIIY 
Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-67 (1953, as amended) genera[J, 
provides for lifetime weekly benefits to injured workers who are 
permanently and totally disabled. The Code provides that pro· 
cedurally a finding by the Industrial Co=ission of permanen: 
total disability shall be tentative pending referral of t''' 
injured worker to the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation und2 
the State Board of Education for rehabilitation training. le 
If the Division of Vocational Rehabilitiation certifies in writ· 
ing to the Industrial CoIIIIIlission that the employee has full, 
cooperated with the Division in its efforts to rehabilitate hie. 
and in its opinion he may not be rehabilitated, then the Cornmis 
sion shall order permanent total disability be paid to him f, 
life. Id. No employee, however, shall be entitled to sue· 
benefits if he fails or refuses to cooperate with the Divisior 
Id. 
In addition, although not relevant here, the loss or per 
nent and complete loss of use of both hands or both arms, or br 
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feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, cons ti-
r,,res µerrnanent total disability, and no tentative finding of 
,,,1,fl•'ni total disability is required in such instances. Id. 
In reviewing this particular statute, it is interesting to 
nule at the outset two characteristics: first, the statute does 
not require that physical impairment be the primary factor in a 
permanent total disability determination; and second, age is not 
a factor which is statutorily excluded as a relevant factor in 
such a claim. 
Generally speaking, the standard applicable to permanent 
total disability claims is whether the Applicant is unable to 
engage in his usual work or work which a person of his capabili-
ti es could per form. The Utah Supreme Court in United Park City 
Mines Co. v. Prescott, 393 P.2d 800, 801-02 (Utah 1964) set forth 
the basic definition of total disability in this state as fol-
lows: 
[A] workman may be found totally disabled if 
by reason of the disability resulting from his 
injury he cannot perform work of the general 
character he was performing when injured, or any 
other work which [a person] of his capabilities 
may be able to do or to learn to do .•.. 
This definition has been subsequently cited by the Court with 
approval. ~·£·• Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc., 622 P.2d 790, 792 
(Utah 19&0). Clark v. Interstate Homes, Inc., 604 P .2d 937, 938 
(Utah 1979). Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co. v. Industrial 
Lommiss1on, 424 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 1967). See Caillet v. Indus-
t~ul Commission, 58 P.2d 760 (Utah 1936). With regard to the 
?•:nc' 1 ally accepted definition set forth by this Court in the 
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United Park City Mines Co. case, it should be noted that 
Court defined total disability in terms of "disability" L1'' 
than "impairment", the former te[m relating to a cumbinciL1', 
generally accepted job-related factors such as educ at ion, tt, 
ing, work history and age. 
Similarly, Professor Larson in his treatise on 1,orkme1, 
compensation has described total disability as follows: 
'Total disability' . is not to be interpret cc: 
literally as utter and abject helplessness. 
Evidence that claimant has been able to earn 
occasional wages or perform certain kinds of 
gainful work does not necessarily rule out a 
finding of total disability nor require that it be 
reduced to partial .. 
Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is 
accepted in virtually every jurisdiction, total 
disability may be found in the case of workers 
who, while not altogether incapacitated for work, 
are so handicapped that they will not .be employed 
regularly in any well known branch of the labor 
market. The essence of the test is the probable 
dependability with which claimant can sell his 
services in a competitive labor market, undis-
torted by such factors as business booms, sympathy 
of a particular employer or friends, temporary 
good luck, or the superhuman efforts of the claim-
ant to rise above his crippling handicaps. (Cita-
tions omitted). 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation, Section 57.51 (Supp. 1983). 
The first Utah case discussing the relative burdens 
proving permanent total disability was Caillet, supra. There 
the Court reversed an Industrial Commission denial of permane· 
total disability holding: 
The evidence in this case . conclusively 
[shows] that the plaintiff is permanently and 
totally disabled from either securing or per form-
ing work of the general character that he was 
performing when injured. he by such evidence 
established a prima facie case, and in the absence 
ot any showing that he is able to secure .md 
-12-
perform worl< of a special nature not generally 
available, he is as a matter of law, entitled to 
an award as and for permanent total disability. 
[Citations ommitted] No evidence was offered or 
r>oc:eived before the Commission which showed, or 
tended to show, that plaintiff is able to secure 
employment of a special nature not generally 
available or that he is able to perform the duties 
of such employment. The evidence is all to the 
contrary. 58 P.2d at 762-63. 
More recently, in Buxton v. Industrial Commission, 587 P.2d 
lil (Utah 1978) this Court was presented with a factual situation 
'A't,ere the applicant, due to a combination of pre-existing as well 
as industrial injuries, was made unemployable. The Court ana-
],zed the situation as follows: 
[T]he Commission is not vested with arbitrary 
powers; and it cannot simply ignore competent and 
credible evidence when there is nothing discredit-
ing therein and there is no evidence to the con-
trary .... It is the Commission's duty to determine 
whether that loss of function represents total 
disability in terms of capacity to perform re-
munerative employment, and the determination must 
be based on competent evidence. 
If after a substantial permanent partial 
disability award is made, it is discovered em-
pirically that that injured employee is not em-
ployable with his disability and it is certified 
that he cannot be vocationally rehabilitated 
despite his cooperation there is prima facie 
justification (subject, of course, to refutation) 
for changing the disability rating from partial to 
total. Id. at 123-24. 
In the present case the employee suffers from a permanent 
partial overall impairment which combines for a total loss of 
body function of 26/o. Record, pp. 154-56. In addition, the 
Employee's treating physician recommended retirement because he 
f~J t the Employee could not return to his former worl< in the 
rntr,.~s rlnd would be better off not doing so. Record, pp. 28, 81, 
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86 and 93. The Utah State Board of Education, Division o[ Rd1,1 r 
ilitation Services, certified in writing that the empJ,,,,' 
unable to qualify for rehabilitation or re-employment. P·c 
p. 97. This certification satisfies the statutory requ1rc·11"' 
for changing his disability rating from partial to total. Ute' 
Code Annotated, §35-1-67 (1953, as amended). Brundage, ~­
This certification was unquestionably based upon, at least ,, 
part, the Employee's age at the time of his industrial injury 
(67), his limited formal education (third year of high school) as 
well as his limited and heavy, manual labor worl< history involv-
ing 40 years of coal mine worl<, approximately 85/o of which was 
underground. Record, pp. 1, 21 and 30. The conclusion is, 
therefore, inescapable that the employee is unable to work, 
cannot qualify for rehabilitiation or re-employment and, as a 
result thereof, is permanently totally disabled. 
The law is quite clear that once an employee demonstrates 
his inability to do his previous work, the burden shifts to the 
opposing parties to rebut the prima facie case appropriatelv 
raised. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Cail let, ~ at 
763, once the Claimant demonstrates that he is unemployable, it 
is incumbent upon the Defendants to show that he " ... is able 
secure employment of a specific nature not generally available o: 
that he is able to perform the duties of such employment." 
In Employers Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Industrial Comm is 
~' 541 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1975), the Arizona Supreme Court tu• 
that when an employee was permanently and totally disabled, 
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burden was placed on the Defendant to show available and suitable 
Pmployment: 
Absent proof of employment reasonably avail-
ab le to one in the 'odd-lot' category the injured 
employee may be classified as totally disabled. 
[citation omitted.] 
We turn next to the quest ion as to whether 
the employer and carrier met the burden of showing 
available and suitable employment in presenting 
evidence about possible employment as a hoist 
operator. The evidence reflected that such em-
ployment was available in the Tucson area less 
than 30 days a year. It was not shown that no 
bending would be required or that hoist operators 
were always free to change positions at will. 
Such evidence falls far short of that required to 
establish available and suitable employment. Id. 
at 583. 
In similar circumstances the Idaho Supreme Court has stated 
that where the evidence is undisputed and is reasonably suscepti-
ble to only one interpretation, whether a claimant falls within 
the odd-lot category is a conclusion of law. Lyons v. Industrial 
Special Indemnity Fund, 565 P.2d 1360, 1364 (Idaho 1977). In the 
same case the Court also held that where the individual does fall 
within the odd-lot category, the burden is on the Defendant to 
show that some kind of suitable work is regularly and continuous-
ly available to an injured workman. Id. Since the Industrial 
Commission failed to meet its burden, the Court reversed its 
decision denying benefits to the injured employee. 
It is the Employee's position that various employability 
tactors, including physical and mental impairment, education, 
'"irk experience, retrai.nability -- and age -- must be considered 
tn mdking d permanent total disability evaluation. In the pres-
e'lt claim, it is undeniable that the Employee suffers from a 26% 
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whole body impairment; that the Utah State Board of Educati,; 1 
Division of Rehabilitation Services certified that there' ic 
reasonable expectation that such services would benet11 
Employee as required by Section 67; and that his treating ph'; 
cian encouraged him to retire since he would not be able 
return to worl< in the mines. Record, pp. 28, 81, 86, 93, 97ar' 
154-56. In addition, the Employee's current age (70) and limiter 
formal education (third year of high school) coupled with his 
approximately 40-year history of heavy underground coal mint 
worl<, approximately 85/o of which was involved in undergroun,; 
employment, further substantiate such a finding in this case. 
Record, pp. 1, 21, 30. 
It is also interesting to note that neither the Employer nc: 
the Second Injury Fund contested such a finding in this case anc 
neither proffered any evidence to rebut the unemployability oi 
the Employee. In Brundage, supra, the plaintiff offered uncon· 
troverted evidence that demonstrated he was unable to sit o: 
stand for prolonged periods of time. This Court in that casr 
stated that the Collllllission " •.. could not have formed a bona fil· 
opinion that plaintiff was not then incapable of re-entering th• 
labor market by reason of physical disabilities." It is th• 
Employee's position here that the Industrial Commission could nc 
have a "bona fide" opinion regarding this Employee's ability : 
re-enter the labor market without any evidence whatsoever frc 
either the Employer or the Second Injury Fund challenging 
Board of Education's written certification of non-rehabilitah 
ity, which such certification was placed inco evidence at" 
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time of the hearing and the parties were well aware of that 
cerlitication, and chose not to request a hearing on it or 
•-";,pl tu retute it in any way. Therefore, it stands unrebutted 
111 this record at this time. Such a situation is very similar to 
Lhc Brundage decision. 
In conclusion, the Employee respectfully requests that the 
frndl administrative decision of the Industrial Commission be 
reversed since it contains a legal proposition which is contrary 
to Workers' Compensation law generally and to the law of this 
jurisdiction specifically; namely, that permanent total disabil-
ity awards must include the specific finding that the primary 
factor of that disability is impairment rather than some other 
factor. Neither the Utah statute nor any decision of this or any 
other Court requires that impairment be a primary factor in a 
permanent total disability claim. In essence, there is absolute-
ly no statutory or case law support for the Industrial Cornrnis-
sion's position in this claim. In fact, the case law of various 
cited decisions of neighboring states specifically holds age as a 
relevant factor in such determinations, without any references to 
analysis of any factor as being a primary factor in such deter-
rninations since to do so would be contrary to the very definition 
of permanent total disability. 
I I I 
THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN 
FAILING TO FIND THAT THE REMEDIAL NATURE 
OF WORRERS' COMPENSATION LECISCAt!ON REQUIRES 
THAT ANY AMBIGUITY INHERENT IN THE PERMANENT 
TOTAL DiSABILITY STATUTE BE RESOLVED 
IN FAVUR OF THE CLAIM 
fhe> Pverr1Jing principle which governs adjudication of 
',,u1kers' Cnmpensation disability claims is that such claims are 
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to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits and th,,, 
any doubts or ambiguities from the evidence are to be resulvc<I 
favor ot the claim. Prows v. Industrial Commission, 611) 
1362, 1363-64 (Utah 1980), citing Chandler v. Industrial Cuo1mi, 
sion, 184 P. 1020, 1021-22 (Utah 1919). The Church of Jes,, 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 P.2, 
328, 332 (Utah 1979) (Dissenting opinion). McPhie v. Industria'. 
Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977). Aslnew v. Industria: 
Commission, 391 P.2d 302, 51J4 (Utah 1964). Mc' K Corp. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 189 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah 1948). The Employe' 
respectfully requests that to the extent that any ambiguit. 
exists in the statutory or case law relative to total permanen: 
disability claims, that all such doubts be resolved in favor ot 
the claim. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Employee respectfully requests that the 
final admministrative decision of the Industrial Commission bi 
reversed and that the Commission be directed to enter an award t: 
him for permanent total disability benefits commencing from th· 
date of 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 
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